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ABSTRACT
This studydocuments a strong inverse relationship between accident rates
and production in a sample of eleven firms in the same narrowly defined industry
classification. Given the detailed set of input controls and controls for
plant—specific and time—specific factors used in the analysis, the study argues
that a theoretical framework that describes firms as operating on well—defined
production frontiers is not adequate for providing an entirely accurate
interpretation of the basic empirical finding.Three elaborations to the basic
production frontier framework are developed and used to interpret the accident—
productivity relationship.
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The basic constuct of microeconomic theory used to describe a firm's
operation is the production frontier. Simply, the production frontier maps the
set of efficient input—-output transformations with a given technolog,r. Factor
prices, then, will determine the position of competing firms on that frontier.
In competitive markets, firms that err in short—run decisions will be forced out
of the industry in the long run. Theoretical elaborations have of course been
developed that permit competing firms to differ in their investments and their
input configurations and still remain viable parts of the industry. There is,
however, a very different tradition in microeconomics that questions the deter-
ministic production frontier framework. Liebenstein's "x—inefficiency1,"
Simon's "adaptive organizations2," and Cyert and March's "bounded—rationality"
in their behavioral theory of the firm3 are leading examples of the view that
competitive market forces do not insure microeconomic efficiency.
These two theoretical traditions provide very different frameworks for
interpreting observed relationships between inputs and outputs. Unfortunately,
empirical tests to distinguish between these views face formidable obstacles.
Analysis of firm—level production would be required; however, accurate models of
production at the micro—level are generally recognized to be much more difficult
to develop than more aggregate forms. Even with an accurate functional form,
micro data on plant operations are not publicly available. Difficulties with
interpretation of any firm—level model will also exist. With the complexities
of multiple input configurations in most production processes, it becomes vir-
tually impossible to distinguish movements between frontiers from disturbances
that force firms inside their frontiers. It is particularly difficult to—2—
control for certain inputs such as investments in information and managerial
ability. Others, who have estimated frontiers empirically and observe points
inside the frontiers, consider such observations as evidence of a problem in
one—sided measurement error.
To consider these important differences in theoretical interpretation, I
analyze a unique set of data on the operations of eleven plants in the same four
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 2621—paper).The specific focus
of the study is the relationship between plant safety and production after
controlling for the effects of capital, labor, and energy. Several elaborations
of the basic production frontier framework are developed and used to interpret
the safety—productivity relationship. To evaluate each of the theoretical fra-
meworks, I consider how reasonable each interpretation is given the nature of
the empirical tests and the structure of control variables.
The study is developed in the four following sections. The next section
describes the detailed model of the paper production process and the input—
output data. Section III presents empirical estimates of the safety—
productivity relationship obtained from the detailed model of production.
Section IV presents the basic economic framework for considering the rela-
tionship between safety andproductionand introduces four elaborations on that
framework. The empirical results obtained in Section III are interpreted within
each of these theoretical frameworks. Finally, the conclusion considers the
implications of broadening the basic production frontier framework to allow for
a degree of persistent inefficiency in microeconomic production.—3—
II.INPUT—OUTPUT DATA AND SPECIFICATION OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS
Monthly observations from January 1976 to September 1982 on the operations
of ten paper millsmakeup the sample for the study. With the aid of on—site
investigations of each mill's production process, the production function given
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Where; Qtonsof physical output;
=threeplant dummies to control for two major product differences
(white paper vs. newsprint; sheeted vs. not sheeted) and one
major process difference (make vs. buy pulp) across the eleven
mills;
=totaldepreciated, deflated value of assets in nine distinct cate-
gories of assets;
PMD1...3=aset of three related dunmty variables to describe whether a plant
isoperating two, three, four, or five or more paper machines (the
two paper machine category is omitted);





TheKD variables provide a direct control for major product and process
differences observed in these mills. The more conventional method of
constructinga value added index is particularly difficult in these mills. The
PMD variable provides some control over scale of operations. The KV and PMV
variablesare fashioned to recognize the principles of input aggregation for a
heterogeneous capital stock. For example, three categories involving energy
generation capital, certain land and buildings, and pollution and recycling
capital are not a direct part of the machinery that acts upon the raw materials
flowing through the process. These categories of capital are therefore kept
separate from production process capital. The capital value variables are
constructed from each mill's monthly asset inventory which contains information
on the current value of each asset. In any month, there are some 15,000 assets
that were allocated to these different categories of capital. L is defined as
the natural logarithim of hourly manhours. A salaried manhours variable was
unavailable for the analysis as was a more detailed breakdown of hourly manhours
into its operating and maintenance labor components. E is the natural logarithm
of BTU's used in production. AC, the Occupational Safety and Health
Admiristration's (OSHA) accident rate, is described in detail below.
This unconventional specification is developed to provide an accurate model
of production in these mills. Equation 1 accounts for over 95% of the total
variation in production in this sample. More conventional functional forms pro-
duce several nonsensical coefficients. For example, in a Cobb—Douglas function,—5--
the coefficient on capital is in fact negative for this set of plants in which
capital plays the central role in transforming raw materials into final goods.
More conventional forms explain a imich smaller proportion of the total variation
m
After controlling for the effects of the prinicipal inputs in this way,
the partial correlation between the accident rate and production will be esti-
mated. AC in equation 1 is the OSHA "all accident incident rate." I is
defined as:
(Doctor Cases +LostTime Cases)_• 200,000
Total hours worked100
The mean of the accident rate variable across all mills is .071 with a standard
deviation of .057. The lowest mill average is .056. The largest mill average
is .099. 16.7% of all mill—months are accident free while the maximum value for
this variable in this sample is .4l.—6—
III.EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ESTIMATES OF THE SAFETY-PRODUCTIVITY RELATIONSHIP
when equation 1 is estimated with the plant data, the coefficient on the
accident rate variable shown in column 1 of Table 1 is obtained. The accident
rate coefficient is —.252 and significant at conventional levels. Higher acci-
dent rates occur in periods of relatively low production. To understand the
nature of this total effect better, the column 2 and 3 specifications are esti-
mated. Column 2 gives the average within—plant effect. The capital dummies
(KD1_3 in equation 1 which control for product and process differences across
plants) serve as dummy variables for groups of plants. A complete set of ten
plant dummies replaces the capital dummies to obtain the equation 2 specifica—
tion. Again, the average within—mill relationship between accidents and produc-
tion is significant and negative. In the column 3specification,a set of time
dummies is added to the column 1 equation to obtain an estimate of the cross—
mill effect. To adjust for time trends and seasonal shifts in accidents or pro-
duction, a set of six year dummies and a set of eleven month dummies are added.
After controlling for time in this way, one finds that high accident rate mills
are low production mills. The cross—plant accident rate coefficient in column 3
is slightly larger in absolute value than the column 1 coefficient, while the
within—plant accident rate coefficient is slightly smaller in absolute value.
All are significantly negative coefficients. Time dummies and plant dummies
included, the accident rate coefficient given in column 1isstill significantly
negative.
To provide a more intuitive understanding of the magnitude of theseTable 1: Accident Rate Coefficients in the Model
of Paper Product ion8-












rate (.108) (.ioo) (.099) (.083)
2.capital dummies yes no yes no
3.plant dummies no yes no yes
4.time dummies no no yes yes






R2 .955 .962 .965 .969
a —standarderrors in parentheses
—significantat the .01—level, one—lailed test
**— significantat the .05—level, one—tailed test
*— significantat the .1O—level, one—tailed test—1—
coefficients,the coefficient obtained in Column 2 of Table 1 is evaluated at
zero, low, average, high, and very high levels of the accident ratevariable
(respectively the minimum and 25th,50th, TSth,and 90th percentiles of the
distribution). This coefficient, the average within—plant effect, is the
smallest in ngnitude. The zero accident rate months correspond to the zero
level of production on the vertical axis in Figure 1. The production loss asso-
ciated with a movement from zero accidents to the median accident rate is 1.31%,
while a movement from zero accidents to the very high accident rate corresponds
to a 2.9)4% drop in production
These significant coefficients may seem small when recalibrated in
terms of percentage shifts in production. However, with the available data, a 1%
shift in production can be recalibrated in terms of changes in sales and then
profits for each mill. For an average month in 1980 (a year in which paper pri-
ces were relatively low), a 1% increase in production (without any cost
increases) is associated with a revenue increase of $32,300 to $l69,)400
depending on the mill. These 1% sales increases would have significantly
affected the profits of these eleven mills. Nine of these mills had positive
operating incomes during 1980; the other two did not turn a profit. For the
nine with positive incomes in 1980, the monthly revenue increase associated with
a i% production increase translates into a 10.9% increase in operating income on
average. For the two with negative operating incomes, the revenue increasefrom
a 1% production gain would have reduced their average monthly loss by lT.1%.
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very high level of accidents (ignoring potential cost increases) would on
average increase profits by one—third.
Omitted Variable Bias
Before presenting the different theoretical frameworks that can be used
to interpret the observed accident rate—productivity relationship, I will first
consider whether the estimated coefficients on the accident rate variable are
spurious correlations that should be attributed to some other factor not
included in the econometric models. Rather than estimate the magnitudes of
possible errors under different assumptions about such a bias, I address this
potential problem in a more direct way. Possible omitted variables that may be
correlated with both accidents and production are taken from the literature on
industrial safety6 and from interviews with mill managers and personnel. Data
on these candidates were then collected from the mills and entered into the
equation.
Most of the variables related to industrial safety suggested in the
literature are already controlled for either by the structure of the sample or
by variables already in the analysis.The production function already includes
variables for manhours and number of paper machines so that scale controls have
already been incorporated. Technology and the pace of work are controlled for
by the homogeneity of the sample and the capital variables in the analysis.
Furthermore, with workforces that are relatively homogeneous in terms of educa-
tion and racial composition, the sample controls for many worker charac-
teristics.—9—
Data on other variables were collected as possible omitted variables:
accession rate; operation of new machinery; and operation of the mill after a
plant shutdown. The literature on industrial safety suggests that workforce
experience may be correlated with safety. as well as productivity. While job
tenure was not consistently available from plants, its converse, the accession
rate, was. Two additional sets of variables were suggested in interviews with
plant personneL It was suggested t.hat when new machinery is being installed,
accidents may be more common and productivity may be relatively low given the
stated level of inputs. Four major machines were introduced in these plants
during the 1976—1982 period. One dumn variable is created for the six—month
period prior to the capitalization date of these machines to see if the
installation period tends to disrupt existing plant operations. A second
variable for the six—month period after the capitalization date is also created
to see if the initial period of operation is one of high accident rates and low
rates of productivity.
Finally, it was suggested in interviews that the period after a strike may
also be a high accident rate—low productivity period. Months with strikes are
not included in the sample on which the Table 1 results are based. During stri-
kes, particularly several extended periods of strike activity during the 1976—
1977 period, mills were either shut—down for lengthy periods or partially
operated by managerial employees. The start—up after a mill has been idle or
run by less experienced employees may then be a low productivity—high accident
period. To test this hypothesis, a dumniy variable was created for the first—10—
quarter of operations after a strike.
To see if any of the variation in the accident rate variable is accounted
for by these variables, the equations in Table 2 are estimated. Whether the
plant dummies are included or not, the accession rate moves most closely with
accident rates. As expected, accidents are more common in months when the
accession rate is higher.
To see if these additional variables help explain any of the relationship
between accidents and production shown in Table 1, the potential omitted
variables are included along with the accident rate in the basic equation 1
model. The results from these equations are presented in Table 3. The coef-
ficients on the accident rate variable remain similar in magnitude and level of
significance to those presented in Table 1 even after these additional variables
are included in the analysis. Among the newly added variables, the periods
around the installation of new machinery appear to be the most important deter-
minants of the level of production. Both before and after the capitalization
dates of new machines, production is significantly lower than one would have
expected given the stated level of inputs.
We now turn to the development of several different theoretical frameworks
for interpreting this robust empirical relationship: in the face of a detailed
set of controls for inputs, plant—specific factors, time—specific factors and
several potential omitted variables, the partial correlation between accident
rates and production is significant and negative. In particular, the discussion
to follow will consider the degree to which the robust empirical relationshipTable 2: Correlates of Accident Ratesa
[Dependent Variable: OSAA accident rate; N508
(i) (2)
1. accession rate .l81** .16l**
(.095) (.098)
2. pre—capitalization .016 .016
period (.013) (.012)
* 3.post—capitalization .019 .01
period (.013) (.Oi1)
4.poststrike period .008 .008
(.010) (.010)
5.plant dummies no yes
R2 .016 .0714
a —standarderrors in parentheses
—significantat the .01—level, one—tailed test
**— significantat the .05—level, one—tailed test
*— significantat the .10—level, one—tailed testTable 3: Accident Rates and Correlates of Accident Rates
in the Model of Paper Product 0a
[Dependent Variable: in Tons of Paper; N=508
a —standarderrors in parentheses
—significantat the .01—level, one—tailed test
**— significantat the .05—level, one—tailed test
















































































should be considered as evidence of constant efficiency or persistent inef—
ficiency in inicroeconomic production.—12—
IV. THEORETICALFRAMEWORKS: INTERPRETING ThE SAFETY -PRODUCTIVITYRELATIONSHIP
Theoretical Framework 1: The Conventional Economic View of Accidents as a
Joint Product
The traditional view in economic theory for considering the rela—
tionship between production and safety considers the two factors as joint
products. In his extensive review of the literature and findings con-
cerningindustrial safety, Oi provides this brief summary of the economic
view:
Textbookproduction functions describe how inputs
of labor and capital can be transformed into out-
puts of economic goods. A more accurate picture is
one in which firms face joint production functions
wherein inputs generate two joint products,
economic goods X and work injuries or accidents A.
If instead of injures A we meausure their comple-
ment, uninjured workers 13, then for a given outlay
for inputs, there is a negative technical trade—off
betweengoods X and uninjured workers B. Given its
outlays for labor, capital, and other inputs
(including safety), a firm can expand its"output"
ofuninjured workers B (achieving a lower injury
rate) only by reducing output of its principal pro-
duct X.T
In this model, there is a positive relationship between accidents and
output, ceteris paribus. While safety expenditures reduce accidents, the
allocation of resources away from capital and labor inputs will decrease
output.This model is shown in Figure 2. For purposes of exposition, let
capital (K) and labor (L) represent all productive inputs. With total input
endowment, I, and l of that endowment devoted to safety, Q(I, l) is





allocating resources away from K and L, output decreases from Qi (I, si) to
Q2 (I, s2)• Any movements between frontiers for which total input endowment is
fixed would yield a positive (negative) relationship between accidents (safety)
and output.
In order to reconcile this theory with the basic inverse relationship
between accidents and output, one must believe that the empirical work does not
control for differences in input endowment. For example, in Figure 2, output
could be increased from Qi to Q3 if the total input endowment is increased.
Such an increase in output could also be associated with fewer accidents if
enough of the additional input endowment is devoted to safety. The movement
between points A and B in Figure 2 would reveal an inverse relationship between
accidents and output.
The detailed set of input control variables makes this interpretation
of the empirical result highly suspect. The basic production model controls for
the total endowment of principal capital, labor, and energy inputs more comple-
tely than perhaps any existing study. More elaborate theoretical frameworks
should therefore be considered.
First Elaboration: Accidents Reduce Efficiency of Inputs
In the previous frameworks, safety expenditures are not considered as an
input that contributes to the production process. Specifically, consider acci-
dents as disruptions that reduce the efficiency or utilization of other inputs.
In Figure 2 then, the movement from point A to point B could be accomplished by
holding fixed the level of capital and labor inputs and increasing the level of—l4 —
safetyexpenditures. Output would expand as productivity—inhibiting accidents
are reduced. If the empirical equations control for variations in the levels of
most inputs, but not for variations in safety expenditures, the coefficients on
the accident rate variable could still be mapping movements between well—defined
frontiers.
This first elaboration, while a useful first step, still does not pro-
vide an entirely satisfactory framework that incorporates all of the empirical
results from the last section.First, when the basic model is expanded to
include plant dummies, the accident—production relationship is still signifi-
cantly negative, and my interviews and site visits provided no evidence of any
major changes in safety expenditures over time within mills. Second, and even
more challenging to the view that the accident rate coefficients only map
changes in output associated with changes in safety expenditures, the inverse
relationship between accident rates and output remains significant even after
the basic model is expanded to include plant dummies, month dummies, year dum-
mies and a set of controls for potential omitted variables.
Second Elaboration: Accidents Have a Random Component
A given level of safety expenditures do not seem to guarantee a fixed
accident rate. There is a great deal of variation in accident rates frorrr month
to month within each plant. Safety expenditures do not seem to vary to this
extent, so that movements in the accident rate do not mirror changes in safety
expenditures precisely. Therefore, accidents, A, can be considered to have a
probabilistic component. Regardless of the level of safety expenditures, the
accident rate is still a random variable governed by some probability distribu——15—
tion. With a fixed input endowment, I, and i of I devoted to safety there is
still a certain probability that a plant will have no accidents. For given
levels of the parameters I and s, the no accident state is the most productive.
However, the zero—accident production frontier, Qrnax (I,s), is not guaranteed,
since accidents are governed by a probability distribution. Expected output
will be further influenced by the product of the probability of accidents and




From this equation, one sees that safety expenditures determine expected output
in two ways. First, when a larger share of the total input endowment is devoted
to safety, the zero—accident frontier is closer to the origin of isoquant space.
Second, safety expenditures also will reduce the probability of accidents. As
in the first elaboration, accidents reduce the efficiency of other inputs, so
that is negative. Therefore, the two effects of safety expenditures on
output are in opposite directions.
The Equation 2 model is shown in Figure 3.
is the nximum output possible with fixed input endowment I and devoted
to safety. All points to the left of this zero—accident frontier are
possible. Even zero output mayoccurin the rare event of an accident that
halts production completely for an extended period. Safety expenditures










that governs how often output is forced below Q1. Therefore, safety
expenditures determine how far the expected output frontier lies
below the maximum output frontier Q.
Now, if safety expenditures are increased from s1 to by reallo-
cating resources away from capital and labor, the effects on output are
more complicated than in the previous framework. The zero—accident
0 0
frontier given willlie below Q,. However, with s2 > s1, the
expected accident rate is less under s2 than it is under s1. The entire
0
set of points to the left of are still possible, hut perturbations off
the zero—accident frontier will not occur as frequently. In Figure 3,
E 0
therefore, the width between and is narrower than the width between
E 0
and Q1. WhiletheQ2—band lies entirely below the Q1—band in Figure 3,
it is possible that the bands overlap. In fact, may exceed Q, so
that expected output can be increased when a greater proportion of the
total input endowment is devoted to safety.
With each elaboration to the theoretical framework, one is also intro-
ducing a more complicated, and probably more realistic, view of the role of
managers. Under the initial framework with a fixed input endowment (in the
absence of regulation), a manager selects safety expenditures equal to zero and
maximizes output. With the first two elaborations, the decisions for the
manager are more complex. Now a manager must weigh the loss in output from
moving resources out of production against the gains associated with operating a
safer, and therefore more productive, plant. To guage these gains, a manager—17—
must understand the effect of accidents on output, and the effects of safety
expenditures on accidents.
Third Elaboration: Random Disturbances to Production Discourage Customers
The theoretical elaborations introduced thus far show that a manager
must search for that value of s that will maximize expected output. k third
elaboration, also with accidents as a random disturbance to production,
demonstrates that the manager's task may be even more complicated than dust
picking the outermost expected production frontier. Assume that the marginal
cost of production is constant for each producer; therefore the firm's supply
curve is horizontal where price equals marginal cast. However each firm faces a
capacity constraint determined by the size of the plant. The supply curve beco-
mes vertical at that value of capacity production, Q (see Figure 4). Because
the firm's customers value certainty of deliveries (and therefore dependability
of production), accidents may further affect the firm's revenue in any given
period. The firm's customers make up his current demand, D0 in Figure 4. The
first equilibrium point (A) corresponds to the amount the firm expects to
supply, E(QS(s )).Thisis the amount that was given by Equation 2
=ma.x''
+ Howeverif the production manager does not
recognize the effect that accidents have on quantity demanded, he will find that
the expected quantity supplied E(QS(s1)) may be greater than the quantity
demanded, ct(s1), at his chosen level of safety expenditures. More specifically,
once an an "unexpected" level of accidents results in lower than expected pro-
duction, previous customers will become unsatisfied. Risk averse customers,









Q(s)=Q (s ) E(QS(s1))—18—
firm mayproduceat or above its expected output frontier in the following
period, the demand he once faced is no longer there.
A more formal treatment of the hypothesis rests on the assumption
that the quantity demanded, like that supplied, depends on the random
disturbances, A:
QD =QD(pA(s)) (Equation 3)
In the short run, the firm will want to generate the maximum revenue from







Q= Q (in,A(s)) ;and
S=max'
+'ATK
Figure14showsthat the expenditure on safety which maximizes
expected output, s1, may not be the expenditure which maximizes revenue.
Becauses1 eventuallyleads to a quantity demanded, Q whichis lover
thanQ5(s1), only Q(s1) is sold (point C in Figure 14);leftoveroutput
cannot be sold and revenue equals P Q1(s1). The optimal s, s, may
involvegreater safety expenditures and a lower expected output. But the
increase in sustained demand will generate increased revenue. With the random
disturbances to production also influencing the level of sustained demand,—19—
managers may no longer simply try to maximize expected output.Pdditional
expenditures on safety will lead not only to a loss in expected outputhut a
decreasein the variance of production. This more stable production can lead to
an increase in sustained demand and therefore greater revenue in the long run.
This elaboration complicates the managerial decision process even
further. The manager must now consider three effects of safety expenditures:
(i) safety expenditures reduce output by diverting resources away from capital
and labor; (2) they increase output by making productivity—inhibiting accidents
less frequent; and (3) they increase profitability by reducing the variability
of production, thereby stabilizing the demandfrom customers.
Onemightarguethat an inventory would reduce the importance of
considerations (2)and(3), particularly for a non—perishable product like
paper. However, in the paper industry, final product inventories areof
limited value. It is relatively easy to accomodate the detailed specifi-
cations of a customer's order for paper. The plant maintains large stocks
of chemical dyes, coats, and bonding chemicals. Cutting and sheeting
operations are also easily adapted to the detailed customer specifica-
tions. The final product will meet one customer's specifications, but few
future orders will have those exact specifications. Inventories, in the
particular case of the paper industry, are of limited value.
Fourth Elaboration: Accidents are Sources of Information
Once one realizes that accidents have a random component, and that
safety expenditures can not guarantee a fixed level of accidents, it be——20—
comes clear that managers must make a complicated set of decisions. A
fourth elaboration leads one even further from the simplest economic framework
and provides an even more accurate representation of the firm. Consider a brand
new plant with "frontier" technology. The manager has considered the
three effects of safety expenditures and has made optimal safety expen-
ditures in several areas (maintenance, inspections, safety gear and equip-
ment, employee seminars. etc.).
As in the previous model, these safety expenditures, s1, define
an expected output frontier, Q. However, accidents will occasionally
force production inside its expected frontier. Now, elaborate on the
model so that accidents are not only random disturbances but also sources
of information. Viewed in this way, accidents reveal trouble spots.
After an accident, a manager estimates that the probability of another
accident in the same spot is quite high and makes the necessary investments
to fix the trouble spot. While the increase in safety expenditures from
S1to2 takes resources away from capital and labor, the shift in the expected
isoquant is not toward the origin but away from it, This is because the
manager's stock of information about his plant has increased from i1 to i2
The more efficient safety expenditure s2 was not made in state 1 since it would
have been too costly to find the trouble spot. Put another way, in state 1 it
would have been very costly (extensive policing of the plant) to locate the
trouble spot. Now with greater information in state 2, a small expenditure
repairs the trouble spot.—21—
Figure 5depictsthis model. The contour shows production
with total input endowment, I, safety expenditures, s, the expected
level of accidents, and stock of information, i1. An accident occurs
forcing production to point A which is below the isoquant. After the
accident, two changes in the parameters occur. The information stock
increases to i2andsafety expenditures are increased to s2.Thenet
effectof the changes is to move the expected state 2 isoquant, Q,away
from the origin.
The outermost frontier of production in Figure 5,Q, isnever
realized,since there will never be perfect information, i. Onenow
mightintroduce another elaboration involving search activity to the basic
economic framework. To maintain the production frontier construct, one
could consider "search activity as one competitor for internal resources,
and Ithati expenditures for search are made up to the point where the
marginal cost of search equals the marginal expected return fromit."8
Regardless of any attempts to model or measure such an intangible input, one
must also recognize that the four theoretical elaborations that have been deve—
loped to provide a more realistic framework for interpreting the empirical
results in this study have altered the conventional production frontier
construct considerably. Itisperhaps more reasonable to believe that empirical
micro—productivity research, as in this study, estimates some sort of "average"
production function through some fuzzy band of observed input-output con-







as a true "frontier," since observed production will often exceed the input—
output points along the average production function. Across competitors over
long periods of time, disturbances to production would have to be relatively
equal for all firms to remain part of the industry. For data aggregated over
time or firms, however, the production frontier framework might he a more reaso-
nable approximation as disruptions to production average out. However, the
deterministic production frontier framework can be a misleading description of
the actual day—to—day operations of individual firms.—23—
VI. CONCLUSION —HOWFAR INSIDE THE FRONTIER?
The magnitude of the disturbance effect of accidents on production
ranges to about 3% of production. A 3% shift in production is shown to
correspond to a sizeable shift in profits. The effect of accidents on the per-
formance of firms was selected for this study since it seemed that accidents by
their very nature should be thought of as having a random component.
Expenditureson safety do not guarantee a fixed level of accidents. The acci
dent rate coefficients, in equations with detailed sets of controls for
variations in the level of productive inputs, could therefore representdistrup—
tions to the production process. Still, the magnitude of these disruptions may
be viewed as a second—order consideration. However, safety is only one dimen-
sion of plant operations. By considering just one additional factor that keeps
firms inside their frontier, one begins to realize that the distance between
observed production and frontier production may be substantial.
Strikes have long been recognized as economically inefficient
phenomena.9 Both labor and management would have been better off had they
reached the eventual solution without a strike. With the rare exception of
timeswhen managers partially operated plants during strikes, plants were at the
origin of isoquant space when on strike——clearly on no frontier. In this
sample,over the period from January 19T6 to September 1982, strike days in the
mills ranged from a low of no days to 239 days (or 9.7% of all potential
operating days). On average, a mill lost 6.0% of potential operating days.
Under the assumption that a mill would have matched its production in the same214
monthof the previous year had it not been on strike, one finds that mills lost
up to io.6% of total production over the period to strikes. The average loss
was 6.1i%.Moreover,with salaried personnel still on the payroll and expensive
capital idle, the shutdowns during stikes in this industry provide staggering
examples of microeconomic inefficiency.
By considering this one additional dimension, the distance between
observed production and frontier production widens substantially. Furthermore,
in other sectors, when production is not machine—paced and more under the
control of employees, these disturbances may be even more noticeable. In
short, the theoretical elaborations that suggest that firms operate inside and
noton frontiers can be more than a second—order consideration——particularly for
empirical research at the micro—level.
Inaddition, this theoretical distinction in the framework for analyzing
microeconomic production generates very different research questions. The
dimensions which are subject to managerial discretion and decision making must
be better documented. These dimensions and their effects on productivity should
be an active area of micro—level research. At aggregate levels of analysis, the
deterministic frontier framework provides a useful theoretical construct.
However, at the micro—level one should try to allow for interpretations that
acknowledge the sources of microeconoinic inefficiency.
The view of the firm developed through detailed empirical analyses of
similar firms provides a significant set of elaborations to the basic economic
framework of well defined production frontiers. Here, the real frontier is—25—
viewed as some unreachable moving target. Managers imist make decisions along a
number of dimensions to runtheirfirms. Each dimension involves a number of
detailed component decisions. The safety dimension, for example, involves dec—
sions about capital equipment, safety gear, awareness programs and responses to
regulatory guidelines. Decisions are made in each area. After the resulting
performance is evaluated, adjustments are made. Even in the most competitive of
environments, firms will vary in their decisions, their investments, and there-
fore their performance. Furthermore, a poor managerial decision in one area
which leads to some degree of microecoriomic inefficiency- can be counterbalanced
by any number of sound managerial decisions not matched by competitors. What is
required in a competitive environment is not a correct decision and investment
at every turn. With the countless number of decisions required to run a firm,
that is not possibile. A firm does, however, have to make enough correct deci-
sions so that its performance does not lag behind that of its competitors for
too long. Firms that fair poorly today can remain viable competitors since
dynamic adjustments can lead to more rapid movements toward that ever moving,
unreachable final frontier of production. Detailed observation of the opera-
tions of similar firms and analysis of data on their production processes leads
to much the same conslusion that Liebenstein developed over twenty years ago:
"the production frontier is neither completely specified or known. An experi-
mental factor always exists." 10—26—
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